State v. McHugh: The Louisiana Supreme Court Upholds Gaming Checks by Niedwiecki, Anthony S.
Golden Gate University School of Law
GGU Law Digital Commons
Publications Faculty Scholarship
1994
State v. McHugh: The Louisiana Supreme Court
Upholds Gaming Checks
Anthony S. Niedwiecki
Golden Gate University School of Law, aniedwiecki@ggu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/pubs
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Publications by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation
69 Tul. L. Rev. 611 (1994).
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
STATE V. MCHUGH: THE LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT UPHOLDS
GAMING CHECKS
In November 1990, Louisiana wildlife law enforcement officers
were stopping and checking hunting boats in an attempt to keep
hunters from taking too many ducks from Bayou Boeuf.' The officers
stopped the boats and checked the tags that are required to be placed
on every bag of hunted ducks.2 They recorded the signatures on the
tags so they could determine whether the hunters had taken too many
ducks for that day. When they began checking Bayou Boeuf landing
on November 17, they realized that some hunters were using other
hunters' signatures to bring in more ducks than legally allowed.4 The
officers generally checked every boat that passed the checkpoint unless
traffic became too heavy.5
On November 18, the officers stopped the defendants' boat as it
headed toward the landing.6 In response to the officers' queries, the
defendants showed their hunting licenses and told the officers that they
had no ducks, but did have a deer on board.7 After checking the deer,
the officers issued the defendants a summons for not appropriately
tagging the deer."
During trial, the court denied the defendants' motion to exclude
the evidence obtained by the officers because the search and seizure
did not violate the defendants' state and federal constitutional rights.9
The court of appeal reversed, finding that the officers did not have
reasonable grounds for a license check and game inquiry under Article
I, Section 5 of the Louisiana Constitution.0 The Louisiana Supreme
1. State v. McHugh, 630 So. 2d 1259,1261 (La 1994).
2. Id.
3. Id
4. Id.
5. Id at 1261-62.
6. 1d at 1262.
7. Id.
8. Id. Louisiana law requires hunters to tag each part of a slaughtered deer portioned
while hunting. LA. RE. STAT. ANN. § 56:125 (West 1987).
9. McHugh, 630 So. 2d at 1262.
10. State v. McHugh, 598 So. 2d 1171, 1175-76 (La. Ct. App. lst Cir. 1992), rev'd, 630
So. 2d 1259 (La. 1994). Article I, Section 5 of the Louisiana Constitution states:
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Court reversed, holding that gaming checks made during hunting
season in a wildlife habitat do not violate the state or federal
constitutions. State v. McHugh, 630 So. 2d 1259 (La. 1994).
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
protects a person from unreasonable searches and seizures.1 A seizure
occurs when a government agent restrains the liberty of a citizen. 2
The Louisiana Constitution has expanded this protection to include the
right to privacy. The Louisiana Constitution thus gives more
protection to individuals than the United States Constitution has
"afforded by the pre-existing United States Supreme Court
interpretations."' 4
In general, whenever a search and seizure takes place, the police
officer is required to have probable cause to justify the search.15 Police
officers have probable cause if they can "point to specific and
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from
those facts, reasonably warrant [an] intrusion."16 Terry . Ohio was the
first federal case to create an exception to the general rule that
probable cause is required whenever a search and seizure takes place.'7
n Terry, the Supreme Court developed the "investigatory stop"
exception, which allows an officer to stop an individual when the
officer observes unusual conduct and has reasonable grounds to
Every person shall be secure in his person, property, communications, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches, seizures, or invasions of privacy.
No warrant shall issue without probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, the persons or things to be seized,
and the lawful purpose or reason for the search. Any person adversely affected by a
search or seizure conducted in violation of this Section shall have standing to raise its
illegality in the appropriate court.
LA. CoNsT. art. I, § 5.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
12. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1967).
13. LA. CONST. art. I, § 5. For the specific provisions of this section, see supra note 10.
14. State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746,755 (La. 1992).
15. Teny, 392 U.S. at 20.
16. Id at21.
17. See id at 20-27.
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believe that an individual has engaged in or is engaging in criminal
conduct.18 The officer may then investigate and make reasonable
inquiries of the individual.19
In Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, the Supreme
Court held that the use of sobriety checkpoints is consistent with the
Fourth Amendment.' The Michigan State Police set up surprise
checkpoints where every driver was examined for signs of
intoxication." If a driver appeared to be intoxicated, that person would
be directed to another location for further examination.' If the
examination and breath tests showed that the person was intoxicated,
the driver was arrested.' The average delay for the drivers was only
twenty-five seconds.' The Court balanced the state's interest in
preventing accidents, the effectiveness of the program in achieving
that goal, and the level of the intrusion on the individual's privacy
rights.' The Court stated that a seizure occurs when a "vehicle is
stopped at a checkpoint."'  In support of its holding, the Court
reasoned that (1) the invasion was only slight; (2) the state had a great
interest in preventing drunken driving; and (3) the arrest of over one
percent of the stopped motorists proved that the program was
effective.' The Court stated that the police are not required to have
any particularized suspicion to stop a driver at a checkpoint and ask
simple questions in order to determine if there should be further
inspection.' The Court did not address the issue of whether the further
detention of suspicious individuals is constitutional." Rather, the
Court held that the principles discussed in United States v. Martinez-
18. Id
19. Id at30.
20. 496 U.S. 444,447 (1990).
21. Id
22. Id
23. l
24. d at 448.
25. Il The Court used a balancing test developed in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-
51(1979). The Court in Brown held that in considering the constitutionality of a seizure that is
less intrusive than a full arrest, a court must weigh the "gravity of the public concerns served by
the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the
interference with individual liberty." Id
26. Sitz, 496 U.S. at450.
27. Id at 450-55.
28. Id at450-51.
29. Id
1994]
TULANE LAW REVIEW
Fuerte3 must be applied to determine whether more extensive sobriety
testing is valid.'
In Martinez-Fuerte, the Supreme Court upheld the practice of
stopping every car at fixed checkpoints to detect illegal immigrants. 32
The Court also established the requirements for referring a stopped car
for further investigation.33 The Court held that a referral to a
secondary area could be based solely on the fact that the individual
appears to be of Mexican ancestry.34 Because of the importance of
controlling the border and the effectiveness of these checkpoints in
controlling the immigration of illegal aliens, the border patrol officers
must have "wide discretion in selecting the motorists to be diverted
for" further questioning.35
The Court has not been as willing to allow random stops of cars
without the use of fixed checkpoints. In Delaware v. Prouse, the
Supreme Court held that officers may not randomly stop cars in order
to inspect a driver's license and registration. 6 In Prouse, the officers
stopped vehicles without probable cause or reasonable suspicion.37
The Court applied a balancing test, which involves weighing the
governmental interest against the level of intrusion, and examining any
alternative means of achieving the interest that may be less intrusive.38
The Court believed that the intrusion was excessive relative to the
"promotion of [the] legitimate governmental interests."39 The Court
focused on the existence of more effective alternatives to random spot
checks to show that "the incremental contribution to highway safety of
the random spot check" does not justify intrusion.' The Court stated
that the police may stop a vehicle only if they have reasonable
suspicion, because there is a "'grave danger' of abuse of discretion"
30. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
31. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451-52.
32. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 545.
33. Id. at 562. The requirements mandate a finding by the court that: (1) the intrusion
is minimal; (2) the purpose of the stop is legitimate; and (3) the stops are in the public interest.
Id
34. Id. at 563.
35. Id. at 564.
36. 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979).
37. Id at 650.
38. Id. at 654-55.
39. Id. at 654.
40. Id. at 659.
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given to the officers.41 However, the Court left open the possibility of
less intrusive and discretionary spot checks, suggesting roadblocks as
one possible alternative.42
In general, the Supreme Court has held that fixed checkpoints are
allowed, but has tended to be more skeptical of random, possibly
arbitrary, spot checks. The Court has given a great deal of discretion to
officers when stopping motorists at a fixed checkpoint. The Louisiana
Supreme Court, by contrast, has given more protection to individuals,
because the Louisiana Constitution has expanded the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution to include invasions of
privacy.43 The Louisiana Supreme Court first dealt with random
investigatory stops in State v. Parms.44 In Parms, the state police
department set up a random checkpoint without any warning to the
public.45 The officers checked for license and registration; they also
checked to see if motorists were intoxicated.46 The officers were given
no instructions or policy for conducting the checkpoint.47 The court
found that the roadblock violated the United States Constitution
because (1) there was "no advance publicity"; (2) there was "no
evidence that a roadblock operation is more effective than stops made
when there is individualized suspicion"; and (3) the field officers had
unbridled discretion.4s The court did not decide whether the road-
blocks violated the Louisiana Constitution, but stated that it was
doubtful that the roadblocks could pass constitutional muster.49
Nine months later, in State v. Church, the Louisiana Supreme
Court held that sobriety checkpoints violate Article I Section 5 of the
Louisiana Constitution if the officers lack "reasonable suspicion or
probable cause to believe that [the] defendant ... had violated some
41. Mat at 662 (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543,559 (1976)).
42. Id. at 663. Roadblocks were later held constitutional in Michigan Department of
State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990). For a discussion of Sitz, see supra notes 20-31 and
accompanying text.
43. L .CoNs. art. I, § 5. For a discussion about how the Louisiana courts have
expanded the right of privacy, see State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 755-57 (La. 1992);
Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher, 553 So. 2d 398, 410 (La. 1989); and Lee Hargrave, The
Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974,35 LA. L. RE. 1, 20-25 (1974).
44. 523 So. 2d 1293 (La. 1988).
45. Id. at 1294.
46. l
47. Id. at 1294-95.
48. Id. at 1303.
49. IAl
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law."50  Unlike in Parms, the officers in Church had been given
detailed procedures for setting up sobriety checkpoints that met the
federal constitutional standards.51 However, the Louisiana Supreme
Court later stated that "reasonable jurists may disagree as to whether
the Church-Parms holding involving motor vehicle sobriety
checkpoints is directly and fully controlling with respect to game
agents' stops of sportsmen in the marsh for questioning with respect to
possible game or boating violations.' 5 2
In the noted case, the Louisiana Supreme Court began its analysis
by determining whether the agent's conduct fell within the
investigatory exception to the warrant requirement during a search or
seizure5 3 The court, applying the Terry v. Ohio rule,54 held that the
state failed to prove that the action fell within the investigatory
exception.55 The court reasoned that because the agents were stopping
every boat without observing any suspicious conduct, the agents did
not have sufficient grounds to suspect that the defendants were
engaged in criminal activity.56 Moreover, the main purpose of the stop
was to check every person's hunting license and to inquire about any
game within the hunters' possession; the agents did not suspect that
each boater was engaging in criminal activity.57 Therefore, the state
failed to prove that it had sufficient grounds to make an investigatory
stop as required by Terry.58
The court next focused on the requirements that the government
must satisfy in order to show that its action falls within the allowable
interference with privacy rights permitted by Article I, Section 5 of the
Louisiana Constitution. The court stated that when a privacy right
interference is less intrusive than a full arrest, the intrusion must be
justified by a compelling state interest that cannot be achieved through
less restrictive means.5 ' The court gave four reasons for holding that
the wildlife gaming stops do not violate the Louisiana Constitution.
50. 538 So. 2d 993,997-98 (La 1989).
51. Seeid at995.
52. Moresi v. Department of Wildlife & Fisheries, 567 So. 2d 1081, 1094 (La. 1990).
53. State v. McHugh, 630 So. 2d 1259, 1262-63 (La 1994).
54. 392 U.S. 1,30(1968); see supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
55. McHugh, 630 So. 2d at 1263.
56. Id
57. Id
58. Id
59. Id at 1264. The court pointed to several state and federal cases that discuss when
the government can interfere with a person's constitutional rights. See, e.g., State v. Perry, 610
616 [Vol. 69
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First, the program furthers the state's compelling interests in
preserving wildlife and regulating the abuse of it.60 Second, the court
concluded that the program serves a governmental need that is outside
the usual law enforcement area.61 Third, the gaming stops are much
less intrusive than actual arrests.62 Fourth, the state does not have a
less restrictive means to accomplish its goals.63 The court pointed to
statutes and provisions in the constitution to show the "paramount
importance of [the] invaluable natural resources" in Louisiana.64 The
court specifically pointed to the Public Trust Doctrine in the state
constitution that is designed to protect, conserve, and replenish all of
the state's natural resources. 65 In addition, "the defendants concede[d]
that the state has a compelling interest in preserving the wildlife and in
regulating its exploitation."
66
The court discussed the special governmental need, outside the
law enforcement field, to have the agents check game and licenses.
The agents help promote the state's interest of "protecting, conserving
and promoting replenishment of the wildlife of the state' through
checking hunter licenses and the game they have within their
possession.' By checking the game, the agents are able to examine
the factors that relate to the protection of wildlife.68 For example, the
court stated that the agents are able to better understand and gather
"information pertaining to the appearance, quality, quantity, health and
habits of animals taken or sighted."69 Therefore, there is a great need
to have the agents question each hunter.
So. 2d 746, 757-58 (La. 1992); Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher, 553 So. 2d 398, 401-02 (La.
1989); see also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-31 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479,485-86 (1965); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,303-07 (1940).
60. McHugh, 630 So. 2d at 1264-65.
61. Id at 1265.
62. Id at 1266.
63. Id at 1265-66.
64. Id at 1265 (citing LA. CoNsT. art. IX, §§ 1, 7; LA. REv. STA. ANN. §§ 56:3 (West
1987), 56:103 (West 1987 & Supp. 1994), 56:109 (West 1987 & Supp. 1994), 56:116-:121.1
(West 1987 & Supp. 1994), 56:301.1 (West 1987), 56:304 (West 1987), 56:701-:803 (West
1987 & Supp. 1994)).
65. Id The Public Trust Doctrine appears in Article 9, Sections 1 and 7 of the
Louisiana Constitution. LA. CONST. art IX, §§ 1, 7. The court found that these sections
"establish[ed] a standard of protection which the legislature and all public trustees are required
to vigorously enforce." McHugh, 630 So. 2d at 1265.
66. McHugh, 630 So. 2d at 1265.
67. l
68. d
69. Id at 1265-66.
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The court reasoned that since the encounter only lasts for a
couple of minutes and only involves a few questions, the stop falls far
short of being similar to an arrest.7" The court further reasoned that the
impact of the checks on non-hunters is almost nonexistent, so only a
small segment of the population is affected.71 Also, hunters should
know that they probably will be stopped for license and game checks. 2
Most hunters generally expect such checks because gaming stops are
made' often and are visible to most hunters during hunting season."
The fact that agents cannot detain a hunter beyond the brief check
unless they have probable cause or reasonable suspicion also illustrates
that the intrusion is only slight.74 All of these factors led the court to
believe that the intrusion caused by the gaming checks is quite small.
The court rejected an alternative that the defendant proposed,
which allows an agent to stop a hunter only if he has reasonable
suspicion that a violation has occurred, because agents would not be
able to tell if a hunter had a license with him without stopping the
hunter and checking.7" Most importantly, the court reasoned that
surveillance of hunting activities is almost impossible because of the
large and constantly changing area of wetlands in Louisiana. 6
Finally, the court distinguished Church and Parms on the basis
that the stops at the sobriety checkpoints were made in a "traditional
criminal law enforcement context,"'77 while the stops in McHugh
served a "special government need outside the traditional law
enforcement context. 7 8 Therefore, the balancing test articulated in the
noted case would not be applied to traditional law enforcement areas?9
The court further stated that the sobriety checkpoints could not pass
constitutional muster under the balancing test because there are less
70. Id at 1266.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. 1d
74. 1d at 1267.
75. Id.
76. Id at 1267-68. The court pointed to the fact that the state had 5.3 million acres of
wetlands and too few officers to protect it Id at 1267. Also, "[t]he demarcation between land
and water in Louisiana's coastal wetlands is constantly fluctuating and often indistinct." Id.
For a discussion on the changing wetlands in Louisiana, see generally Oliver A. Houck, Land
Loss in Coastal Louisiana: Causes, Consequences, and Remedies, 58 To.L L. REV. 3 (1983).
77. McHugh, 630 So. 2d at 1268.
78. Id.
79. Id
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restrictive means of achieving the state's goal of preventing drunk
driving."0 Hence, the court held that the wildlife stops did not violate
the Louisiana Constitution.
The court next discussed whether the stops violated the federal
constitution. The court relied on Sitz, in which the United States
Supreme Court held that unannounced, nighttime sobriety checkpoints
were constitutional.81 The court in the noted case believed that the
wildlife stops are even less intrusive than the stops in Sitz. 2
Therefore, the court used the balancing test articulated in Proue.8 3
First, the court believed that the wildlife stop is less intrusive because
the hunters are on alert to the fact that they may stopped. 4 In contrast,
motorists have no advanced notice of or opportunity to prepare for
stops at unannounced sobriety checkpoints.8 5 Second, the court
rearticulated its belief that the state has a great interest in protecting its
wildlife, that the wildlife stop advances a legitimate state interest, and
that there are no less restrictive means with which to advance the
state's interest.8 6 Therefore, the court held that the state had proved
that the wildlife stops were valid under the Fourth Amendment, but
limited its holding only to wildlife stops described in the noted case. 7
On its face, the court's opinion appears to be inconsistent with the
law that has been developed in the state since the late 1980s. In the
sobriety checkpoint cases, the court seemed to find it necessary to
protect individuals against even the most minor privacy invasions.
However, when the court is faced with the issue of protecting the
environment, it quickly distinguishes the two situations. The McHugh
opinion appears to have added a new exception to what was the
established law in Parms and Church. When police officers are
engaged in stops, the court will not allow warrantless searches without
probable cause or reasonable suspicion. However, the balancing of
interests test from Prouse is used when the search involves a
80. Id
81. Id at 1269; see supra notes 20-31 for a discussion of Michigan Department
of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
82. McHugh, 630 So. 2d at 1269.
83. Id; see Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654-55 (1979); supra text
accompanying note 38.
84. McHugh, 630 So. 2d at 1266.
85. Id. at 1269.
86. Id. at 1270.
87. Id.
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governmental agent outside the "traditional law enforcement
context."88 The fact that this exception has not been clearly articulated
in any previous case shows the court's willingness and desire to protect
the environment.8 ' The court was also concerned with the lack of
alternatives to protecting wildlife from overly aggressive hunters.
The distinction made by the court may also show its distrust of
traditional law enforcement officers. The majority opinion in Parms
discussed the evils of roadblocks as police-state measures. 90 By
allowing agents outside the traditional law enforcement area to make
stops, the court may believe that wildlife stops carry less of a danger of
being a police-state measure.
The court may wish to reexamine how it would analyze sobriety
checkpoints under the balancing test used in McHugh. The court
could have avoided the distinction it made between McHugh and
Church by applying the balancing test and still holding that sobriety
checkpoints are unconstitutional. The court may be heading in this
direction because the McHugh opinion stated that sobriety checkpoints
would not pass constitutional muster even if the balancing test were
used.9 The concurrence also left open the possibility that the sobriety
checkpoints could be reexamined under the balancing test.92 The court
may wish to make the law more consistent by applying the balancing
test to any situation in which an invasion is sufficiently less than a full
arrest. A few other states have found sobriety checkpoints
unconstitutional and wildlife checkpoints valid without distinguishing
between non-traditional and traditional law enforcement functions.93
But until the law changes, the court will apply two different standards
to police and non-police action.
ANTHONY S. NmDWiECKI
88. Id. at 1268.
89. See Donald C. Douglas Jr., Comment, A Comment on Louisiana WMldlife Agents
and Probable Cause: Are Random Game Checks Constitutional?, 53 LA. L. REv. 525, 552-53
(1992).
90. State v. Parms, 523 So. 2d 1293, 1303 (La. 1988).
91. McHugh, 630 So. 2d at 1268.
92. Id, at 1270 (Marcus, J., concurring).
93. See, e.g., Orr v. People, 803 P.2d 509, 512 (Colo. 1990); Drane v. State, 493 So. 2d
294,296 (Miss. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 916 (1987); State v. Tourtillott, 618 P.2d 423,434
(Or. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 972 (1981).
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